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THE SPECIAL DEMURRER AS A
DISCOVERY DEVICE IN GEORGIA

By

EDWARD

E. DORSEY*

Under Georgia procedural rules, the special demurrer has
two dissimilar functions, the first being to compel the striking
or withdrawal of extraneous matter, and the second being to
compel the demurree to plead, or to plead more fully, the facts
relied upon to support his cause of action or defense, or the
theory upon which it is based.
The diversity of these two functions, coupled with the further
rules which prohibit direct appeals from nisi prius rulings on
special demurrer,' but which permit reversal of an eptire proceeding where such a ruling is erroneous,' have for many years
contributed to the accretion of the great body of confusion and
conflict which now makes Georgia practice and procedure an
almost occult science.
There is little difficulty to be found in reducing the first function of the special demurrer to a simple and understandable
rule; necessity requires that every pleading system provide a
method for the elimination of matter which is extraneous to the
issues, or is prejudicial or otherwise improper. In Georgia, the
special demurrer has traditionally satisfied this requirement.'
Thus, the special demurrer is properly used to complain of the
pleading of impertinent and prejudicial matter,4 improper organization of pleadings,' surplusage,' and irrelevant matter.7
The objective of the demurrant who complains of these defects,
which all constitute the pleading of too much matter, is to have
the extraneous matter stricken. If the demurrant is successful
and his demurrer is sustained, the court orders the matter
stricken, and for practical purposes it disappears from the proceedings, cannot be proven, or within strict rules of legal pronrietv referred to by counsel.
*Asociate in the firm of Powell, Goldstein. Frzer & Murnhey Atlanta:
A.B.. 1941. LL.B., 1942, Mercer University; Member Atlanta, Georgia
and Americ. n Bar Associations.

1. Mayor and Council of Alamo v. Smith, 66 Ga. App. 10, 16 S.E.2d 762
(1941).

2. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Cox. 42 Ga. App. 439. 156 S.E. 733 (1931).

GEORGIA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 138, etc.
DAVIS AND SCHULMAN. svpra, § 139 (12) ; Linder v. Wimberly, 158 Ga.
285, 123 S.E. 129 (1924).
5. DAVIS AND SCHULMAN. supra, § 139 (1): GA. CODE (1933) § 81-103;
News Pub. Co. v Lowe. 8 Ga. ADn. 333. 69 SE. 128 (1910).
6. Martin v. Mayer. 63 Ga. App. 387. 11 S.E.2d 218 (1940).
7. DAVIS AND SCHULMAN, supra, § 139 (14) and cases cited.

3.
4.

DAVIS AND SCHULMAN,

(254)
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The office of this type of special demurrer then is to strike
the offensive matter. But compare this description with the
description of the same pleadings given in Brinson v. Kramer:8
"The office of a special demurrer to a petition is to cause the
plaintiff to fully inform the defendant of facts relied on to make
out the cause of action, so as to enable him to prepare his defense." And again in the older case of Smith v. Bugg,9 a similar
definition is found: "The essential purpose and function of a
special demurrer is to compel amendment."
Obviously, the courts which made the above quoted statements were referring to the second and more complex function of the special demurrer, which may be described as its discovery function. A casual examination of but a few of the decisions which have established this function of the special demurrer shows that it is a most efficient method for the procuring
of essential information, and in fact, many of the decisions have
required the pleading of facts which cannot accurately be described as essential. For exampl& some of the facts which the
courts have required demurrees to plead in response to the "insatiable demand"'" of the special demurrer are the name of a
doctor who treated a personal injury plaintiff" the amount of the
doctor who treated a personal injury plaintiff,"1 the amount of the
of every occurrence pleaded,' 4 the location of a hole in a street
into which a plaintiff fell,' and the name of the agent of a
15.

Bryan v. Mayor and Council of Maron, 91 Ga. 530, 18 S.E. 351 (1893).

corporation with whom a plaintiff claims to have dealt. 6
In addition to these cases, which require the demurree to
plead some bit of fact which in many cases might well be considered evidence, there is another grouo) of cases which require
of a demurree a disclosure, not only of the factual details as his
cause of action, but a full, unambiguous and unevasive statement of the theory upon which the pleader casts his cause." Thus
.8. 72 Ga. App. 63.33 S.F.2d 41 (194. ).
9. 35 Ga. Apn. 317.1,3 S.E. 49 (1026).
10. Griffin v. Russell. 144 Ga. 275. 288, 87 S.E. 10 (1915).
11. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Barnwell, 131 Ga. 791, 63 S.E. 501
(1909).
12. Louisville & Nash-ille R. Co. v. Bradford, 135 Ga. 522, 69 S.E. 870
(1910) ; Griffin v. Russell, supra. Note 10.
13. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Griffith, 111 Ga. 551.36 S.E. 859 (1900).
14. Anthony v. Dudley Sash, Door and Lbr. Co.. 21 Ga. App. 412, 94 S.E.
634 (1917): Brinson v. Kramer, sunpra, Note 8.
16. Cherokee Mills v. Gate Citv Cotton Mills, 122 Ga. 268. 50 S.E. 82
(1905); Chelsea Corp. v. Steward, 82 Ga. App. 679, 62 S.E.2d 627
(1950).
17. Jenkins v. Dunlop Tire and Rubber Corp., 71 Ga. App. 255, 30 S.E.2d
498 (1944): McMath Plantation Co. v. Allison and Co., 26 Ga. App.
744, 107 S.E. 420 (1921); Cedartown Cotton and Export Co. v. Miles,
2 Ga. App. 79, 58 S.E. 289 (1907).
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in Cedartown Cotton and Export Co. v. Miles,"8 Judge Powell
said, "(the Code) requires a higher degree of certainty in pleading than was necessary at common law; but the object to be obtained is the same under both systems, to wit, that the pleadings
be understood by the party, the jury, and the court. They certainly ought to be so certain in full that the court may look to allegations of fact and know whether a cause of action is set forth or
not. The plaintiff is not required to set forth the evidence, either
direct or circumstantial, by which he expects to establish the
traversable facts alleged in the declaration, and a demurrer cannot properly be used to compel him to do so; but all the facts
necessary to be stated should be set forth plainly, and special demurrer will compel this."
Thus, the traditional complaint of the special demurrer that
the pleading to which it is directed is "vague and indefinite" is
a serious one, and has received serious consideration by the
appellate courts of Georgia.
It may even be said, that in a limited way, appropriate use
of the special demurrer under Georgia practice can effect some
of the results available by the discovery weapons provided by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The comparison may be
extreme, but certainly the two aims of any discovery procedure
are met by the special demurrer. These are, first, the procurement of factual information, and this term rather than the term
"evidence" is used advisedly; and second, compulsory pleading
of the full theory of the cause of action by the demurree, thus in
many cases opening the demurree's case to the ultimate general
demurrer, or motion to dismiss.
There is, however, one flaw in the effectiveness of the special
demurrer as a discovery device, and that is a lack of the very
compulsion which is necessary to force the reluctant pleader to
fully and distinctly set forth his cause of action or defense, and
thereby procure compliance with the reouirements of the Code. 9
The difficulty arises when a party files a special demurrer
which calls for additional information either as to the fact or
the theory of his adversary's cause, and such a demurrer is
sustained, and the demurree is given a fixed period of time in
which to amend to meet the defect pointed out by the demurrer.
Normally, the demurree will comply with the order on demurrer by supplying the demanded information by amendment.
But occasionally, the demurree refuses to comply, and attempts
to qo forward with his cause of action without supplying the
information demanded. The ouestion then arises as to what
authority the court has to comel comDliance. This ouestion has
13. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Griffith, 111 Ga. 551, 36 S.E. 859 (1900).
19. GA. CODE (1933) § 81-101.
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been answered by the appellate courts in such various and diverse ways as to make it impossible to outline any clear answer,
or in fact, to delineate with any degree of clarity what the possibilities are.
Of course, in the absence of any efficient remedy to require
compliance on the part of a demurree, the entire efficacy of the
special demurrer as a discovery device is lost. It should be noted
here that this hiatus between the function of the special demurrer
and the authority of the court to compel obedience to its order
on such demurrers, does not occur in those situations in which the
first of the dual uses of the special demurrer outlined here is
sought. That is, when the special demurrer is used to strike
extraneous matter from the petition, it is clear that the court has
ample authority to order such matter stricken and proceed with
the cause of action, it being universally acknowledged that the
court is the judge of what is proper and what is improper matter
in the pleadings before it, subject of course to later appeal. But
when the demurrant is demanding not that matter already
pleaded by the demuree be stricken, but that matter not pleaded
by the demurree be supplied, the question of the court's authority to force the demurree to supply it is subject to a number
of conflicting answers, under the decisions of the appellate
courts.
The decisions on the question of the court's authority may be
roughly grouped into three broad classifications, provided it is
noted at the outset that there is a good deal of overlapping
among the groups. The first of these groups of cases consists of
decisions which hold that if the demurree refuses to supply
the information sought by the demurrer, his petition or answer,
as the case may be, shall be summarily dismissed. The second
group of cases consists of decisions which hold that if the demurree refuses to supply the information, the petition may be
dismissed, but only if the delinquency complained of relates to
the entire cause of action; if, however, the demurrer goes only
to some particular part of the petition without which a valid
cause of action would still be set forth, then these cases hold
that the court should merely strike the defective portion, without dismissing the action. The third classification of cases consists of decisions which hold that if the demurree refuses to
supply the information sought by the demurrer, the action should
be dismissed on general demurrer, because without the information sought by the special demurrer, the petition is so vague and
indefinite as to be vulnerable to general demurrer. The obvious
logical defect in this last classification will be discussed hereinafter.
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It should be noted that all of the decisions uniformly require
that when a special demurrer which seeks additional information
is sustained, leave to amend to supply such information should
be allowed."
I. Cases Which Require Summary Dismissal Upon Failure
Of The Demurree To Supply The Demanded Information
Perhaps the leading case of that group which requires the
summary dismissal of a party's pleading upon his refusal to
supply information sought by sustained special demurrer is that
of Hudgins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co." In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he had been injured by the explosion of a soft
drink bottle, and that the bottle had exploded because of the
negligence of the defendant. The defendant filed general and
special demurrers, of which the special demurrer complained that
the allegations of negligence were too general in their nature.
The court reserved decision on the general demurrer but sustained the special demurrer allowing ten days leave to the plaintiff
in which to amend the petition. An amendment was filed, but it
was ineffective and did not meet the demurrer. The trial court
dismissed the plaintiff's petition, and on appeal it was held:
As tile plaintiff did not except to the order sustaining the special
demurrer to the original petition and requiring him to amend, it
must be assumed that this judgment was correct. The amendment
(lid not cure the defect in the original petition pointed out by the
special demurrer, unless the allegations with reference to the plaintiff's inability to ascertain the real cause of the explosion had this
effect ..... ...
The plaintiff having been given an opportunity to
amend, to meet the defects in the original petition pointed out by
the special demurrer, and the amendment offered not being sufficiently definite to cure the defects, there was no error in dismissing
the petition, without regard to whether the petition was good in
substance. It is therefore unnecessary to determine whether the
general demurrer should have been sustained.

It should be noted that although the pernicious doctrine of
"law of the case" is prominent in the above quotation, it does
not in any way affect the basis or result of the decision of the
court.
20. Abernathy v. News Pub. Co., 45 Ga. App. 693, 165 S.E. 924 (1932).
The computation of the time so allowed, and the application of the
court's order on demurrer to a proffered amendment has been. the
subject of much litigation, some of very recent date. See Hayes v.
Simpson, 83 Ga. App. 22, 62 S.E.2d 441 (1950) ; Clements v. Hollingsworth, 206 Ga. 255, 56 S.E.2d 505 (1949) ; Parker v. Giles, 71 Ga. App.
763, 32 S.E.2d 408 (1944); Peoples Loan v. Allen. 198 Ga. 516, 32
S.E.2d 175 (1944) ; Holcomb v. Jones, 197 Ga. 825, 30 S.E.2d 903
(1944).
21. 122 Ga. 695, 50 S.E. 974 (1905).
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Again, in the case of Driskal v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. 2
a similar situation was considered by the Supreme Court. This
was an action to recover upon a life insurance policy, and the
defendant had filed general and special demurrers, the special
demurrer calling for certain material information and to require
distinct allegations as to such provisions of the policy. The trial
court sustained the special demurrer granting thirty days in
which to amend, but the plaintiff did not file any amendment
which met the requirements of the order on demurrer. The trial
court then summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the
Supreme Court said:
In sustaining the special demurrer which called for certain information, the Court ruled that the defendant company was entitled to
the information called for by the special demurrer, and that the
petition was defective in the respects wherein it was claimed in the
demurrer to be defective; and it is manifest that the amendment to
the petition, which was made subsequently to the ruling sustaining
the demurrer, did not meet the demurrer which had been sustained.

Thus, "the Court did not err in dismissing this case after the
amendment filed by counsel for petitioner."
Another of the cases in which special demurrers complaining
of the generalities of the allegations of negligence were sustained, is that of Blackstone v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. "
There the plaintiff alleged that while he was in the employ of
the defendant railroad he was hanging on the side of a boxcar
and was looking back towards the train as it was his duty to do
and that he was hit by an electric light pole which had been
allowed to be placed "too near the track." The defendant railway demurrer specially and generally, particularly complaining
that the allegation "too near the track" was too general. This
demurrer was sustained, and no amendment was filed which
met the order on demurrer. The trial court dismissed and on
appeal the Supreme Court held:
While the petition sets out as a fact that the injury was sustained
because the pole was erected and maintained too near the track,

these allegations are too general and indefinite to withstand the effect
of a special demurrer . . . We do not mean to say that, in the absence of a special demurrer directed to this general allegation, the
petition would not, when considered as a whole, be. held to be good;
but in this case the defendant specially demurred to this allegation as

being insufficient... The general allegation could of course have been
cured by amendment, but that was not done, nor offered to be done;
and on this ground we think the demurrer was properly sustained and
22. 144 Ga. 534, 87 S.E. 668 (1916).
23. 105 Ga. 380, 31 S.E. 90 (1898).
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find no error in the judgment of the trial court in dismissing the petition.

There are other cases of similar import. 4
Were it not for the fact that there are other decisions of
both appellate courts which flatly contradict these decisions,
the problem would be simple, but as will be shown, the cases
in this classification have not been consistently followed.
A question which arises in considering the results of a summary dismissal on special demurrer, is whether or not such a
dismissal is a final adjudication, which would support a plea
of res adjudicata in the event that the same plaintiff again
brought the same suit. There is some authority to the effect that
the plea would not be good. This question is discussed in Wolfe
v. Georgia Ry. and Electric Co., although on the point herein
mentioned that decision is probably mere obiter.
II. Cases W/hich Hold That The Defective Portion Of The
Pleading Should Be Stricken, But That The Cause Should
Continue
The leading case in the second classification of cases is that of
McSwain v. Edge." In that case, the Court of Appeals laid
down the rule in language which has been exactly quoted time
and again to this day, as follows:
The proper judgment on a special demurrer, going only on to the
meagerness of the allegations, is not a peremptory judgment of dismissal of the action, but a judgment requiring the plaintiff to amend
and to make his petition more certain in the particulars wherein he
has been delinquent; and then if he refuses to amend, the petition
may be dismissed, if the delinquency relates to the entire cause of action. However, if the special demurrer goes only to some particular
part of the petition, without which a valid cause of action would be
still set forth, the result of finally sustaining the special demurrer
would be, not to dismiss the action, but to strike the defective portion.

The cases which follow this decision are legion, "7 but none of
them has ever enunciated a standard for determining when a
McEachin v. South Georgia Trust Co., 186 Ga. 320, 147 S.E. 390 (1929)
Lastinger v. City of Adel, 69 Ga. App. 535, 26 S.E.2d 158 (1943)
Willingham, Wright and Covington v. Glover, 28 Ga. App. 394, 111
S.E. 306 (1922); Howell v. Fulton Bagr, 188 Ga. 488, 4 S.E.2d 181
(1939); Beerman v. Economy Laundry Co., 153 Ga. 21, 111 S.E. 399
(1922).
25. 6 Ga. App. 410, 65 S.E. 62 (1909).
26. 6 Ga. App. 9, 64 S.E. 116 (1909).
27. Cheatham v. Palmer, 191 Ga. 617, 13 S.E.2d 674 (1941); Griffeth v.
Wilmore, 46 Ga. App. 96, 166 S.E. 673 (1932); Broyles v. Haas, 48
Ga. App. 321, 172 S.E. 742 (1934); Moseley v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 49 Ga. App. 424, 176 S.E. 87 (1934).
24.
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"delinquency relates to the entire cause of action" nor when it
goes "only to some particular part of the petition." Comparing
this rule with the cases from classification one above, it is obvious
that there is a head-on conflict. For example, in the Blackstone
case, above quoted, the plaintiff's entire cause was dismissed upon
his refusal to state the exact distance between the railroad track
and an electric light pole. It could hardly be said that his delinquency in failing to establish the exact number of feet called
for went "to the entire cause of action." Nor may the cases be
reconciled by pointing to a rather obvious trend in the Georgia
decisions which ascribes great importance to the particularity
with which negligence is specified; the Driskal case, being a
contract action, is alone sufficient to obviate the possibility of
any accord between the two classifications. It may be said that
the cases in this classification expound the true rule, because they
are apparently in the numerical majority. Further, the McSwain
rule seems to have been sanctioned by the appellate courts more
recently than the Hudgins rule. For example, in the case of
Cheatham v. Palmer," which was decided in 1941, the McSwain rule was given almost in ipsissimis verbis.
The great and obvious defect in the McSwain rule is that the
party who has interposed the special demurrer, which demurrer
has been sustained by the court, is forced to trial without having
the benefit of the information which he sought by his demurrer,
and which the court adjudicated him entitled to by sustaining the
demurrer. In effect, the demurree is permitted to offer the
demurrant a nibble at the information, but when the demurrant
demands more, the demurree is entitled to take all of it back.
Of course, it may be said that the skeletonized type of pleading
which is now in vogue, particularly in the Federal Courts, does
not require a plaintiff to inform his adversary of all the facts
of his case; but there is no valid analogy between the Federal
procedure and Georgia procedure in this respect, because although the complaint in a Federal action may indeed be
skeletonized and brief, the adversary has at his disposal all of
the Federal discovery procedures which can be speedily, effectively and cheaply utilized. To the contrary, however, under
Georgia procedure aside from the expensive and oftentimes
cumbersome deposition procedure, the adversary has little chance
to effectively discover the plaintiff's position.
III. Cases Holding That Failure To Amend To Meet The
Order On Special Demurrer Make 4 General Demurrer
Good
There is a third group of cases to which may be assigned
28. Supra, Note 26.
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those decisions which do not seem to fit into either of the two
above classifications. Some of the decisions in this latter group do
not actually conflict with one or the other of the previous groups,
but rather represent an outgrowth of the two, and in some instances, an effort to harmonize the two groups. For example, in
the case of Cook v. Kroger Baking and Grocery Co.,2" plaintiff
sought damages for personal injury. Special and general demurrers were filed, complaining that the allegations of negligence
were too generally pleaded. The special demurrer was upheld,
and leave to amend was allowed, but the plaintiff refused to
amend. The trial court then dismissed the petition, on the basis
that the general demurrer was good, and the Court of Appeals,
in affirming this decision said:
Where special and general demurrers are filed to a petition
claiming damages for negligence which alleges in general terms
that the defendent was guilty of negligence, it is not sufficient to
allege the negligence, in general terms when the defendant objects
by proper demurrers to such allegation or allegations, calling the
particulars of the negligence complained of; and when the judgment
on special demurrers requires the pleader to amend in these particulars wherein lie has been delinquent, and he refuses to amend, the
pleading nay be dismissed if the delinquency relates to the entire
cause of action set up in the petition . . . There was no error in
sustaining the special demurrer in this case, and thereafter in sustaining the general demurrer and dismissing the action.

It will be readily seen that while this position has greater
logical appeal than that put forward by the McSwain rule, and
at least to a limited extent is in harmony with it, it cannot be
universally applied. For example, suppose that all that the
special demurrer demands is the date or hour of a particular
occurrence; if the plaintiff refused to amend his petition to supply such information, would the trial court be justified in dismissing his entire cause of action? None of the other cases
which may be assigned to this group3" provide a suitable solution to this contretemps.
CONCLUSION
The special demurrer affords an efficient discovery device un,der Georgia practice, so long as the adversary party is tractable;
if the demurree refuses to supply the information sought by demurrer, and approved by the court, there is a substantial conflict of the Georgia authorities as to what action the trial court
may take to enforce compliance with its order on demurrer.
Obviously, reform either by judicial decision or by statutory
enactment is desirable in this field.
29. 65 Ga. App. 141, 15 S.E.2d 531 (1941).
30. McEachin v. South Georgia Trust Co., 168 Ga. 320, 147 S.E. 390
(1929); Johnson v. Edwards, 147 Ga. 438, 94 S.E. 514 (1917).

